

I, Anderson J. Duff, state as follows:

1. I am an attorney of record for Plaintiff BMaddox Enterprises LLC and Counterclaim Defendants BMaddox Enterprises LLC and Brandon Maddox (“BMaddox”) in the above-captioned matter, and I am familiar with the relevant file, records, and pleadings.

2. As directed by the Court’s June 7, 2017 Order, ECF No. 15 ¶ 7, Plaintiff served PDF copies of the Verified Complaint to info@ffltrust.com via email and hard copies to Defendants via personal service at 55 Quayside House, 302 Kensal Road, London, W10 5BL, United Kingdom.

3. Defendants all appeared and, for the past few years, have actively litigated against Plaintiff.

4. As described in the attached memorandum and in the procedural history below, Default Judgement against Defendants Osko M Ltd and Platinum Avenue Pty Ltd is warranted.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

5. Immediately after initiating this proceeding under seal, BMaddox moved ex parte for a temporary restraining order. (Mot. TRO, ECF No. 22.)

6. On May 30, 2017, Judge Abrams signed a then-sealed temporary restraining order that protected Bmaddox’s rights, required Plaintiff to post a \$10,000 bond, and ordered Defendants to appear and show cause on June 6, 2017 or as soon thereafter as Defendants’ counsel could be heard why an Order pursuant to Rules 64 and 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and § 503 of the Copyright Act should not be entered granting Bmaddox a preliminary injunction as described therein. (TRO, ECF No. 15.)

7. Defendants failed to appear at the June 6, 2017 hearing, but when they had a representative from Australia call both the Court and Plaintiff’s counsel, the Court allowed

Defendants time to collect themselves and ordered Defendants once more to show cause on June 29, 2017 why a preliminary judgment, as requested by Bmaddox and described in the Court's previous order, should not issue. (Order 1, ECF No. 18.)

8. No written submissions or response of any kind were received until Defendants' June 28, 2017 memorandum in opposition to Plaintiff's application for a preliminary injunction, which Defendants submitted less than twenty-four hours before the long-scheduled, second show cause hearing. (Defs.' Mem. Opp'n Pl.'s Appl. Prelim. Inj., ECF No. 25.)

9. Defendants' next submission to the Court, almost exactly one month later, was a Verified Answer flatly denying many allegations in the Complaint that were and are supported by uncontested evidence. (Defs.' Answer, ECF No. 32.) Defendants' July 25, 2017 Answer also asserted sixteen counterclaims described in two hundred forty-eight paragraphs. (Defs.' Answer, ECF No. 32.)

10. On the same day, Defendants also moved for a temporary restraining order claiming that four of their counterclaims warranted such relief. (Countercl. Pls.' Mem. Supp. TRO, ECF No. 33.)

11. Roughly two months after receiving notice of the Court's May 30, 2017 Temporary Restraining Order, and after agreeing to combine a hearing on Plaintiff's application for a preliminary injunction with a trial on the merits, Defendants filed a motion requesting dissolution of the TRO. (Defs.' Mot. to Dissolve TRO, ECF No. 47.)

12. Magistrate Judge Pitman issued a Report and Recommendation on September 8, 2017 recommending that the temporary restraining order be dissolved (R. & R., ECF No. 58), which Judge Abrams adopted on October 23, 2017. (Order, ECF No. 78.)

13. On March 6, 2018, after an in-court discovery conference, Magistrate Judge Pitman ordered Defendants to produce all documents responsive to Plaintiff's November 6, 2017 Requests for Production on or before March 20, 2018. (Mar. 6, 2018 Order, ECF No. 111.)

14. After another in-court discovery conference before Magistrate Judge Pitman, he ordered Plaintiff to file a supplemental brief setting out the deficiencies with Defendants' discovery responses. (May 3, 2018 Order, ECF No. 148.)

15. On May 11, 2018, Defendants' second counsel moved to withdraw from his representation of Defendants. (Mot. Withdraw, ECF No. 149.)

16. Plaintiff and Counterclaim Defendants filed their Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Their Third Motion for Sanctions on May 16, 2018 in accordance with Magistrate Judge Pitman's May 2, 2018 Order. (ECF No. 153.)

17. On September 30, 2019, Magistrate Judge Pitman issued an Order denying all pending motions for sanctions and requiring Defendants to "[n]o later than October 21, 2019 . . . produce to plaintiff all documents responsive to plaintiff's document requests." (Sept. 30, 2019 Order 18, ECF No. 178.)

18. The Order further required that "[n]o later than October 21, 2019, defendants are to respond fully to plaintiff's interrogatories." *Id.*

19. Magistrate Judge Pitman cautioned that "Defendants are warned that an unjustified failure to comply with this Order will result in the imposition of sanctions, which may include the entry of a default judgment against all defendants." *Id.* (emphasis in original).

20. On October 22, 2019, Plaintiff submitted a letter to Magistrate Judge Cave requesting a pre-motion conference to address Defendants' failure to comply with Magistrate Judge Pitman's deadline. (Oct. 22, 2019 Letter, ECF No. 180.)

21. Magistrate Judge Cave then issued a Scheduling Order requiring Defendants to respond to Plaintiff's letter-motion by "Friday, December 13, 2019." (Oct. 28, 2019 Order 1, ECF No. 181.) (emphasis in original). Magistrate Judge Cave's Scheduling Order stated that "IF DEFENDANTS FAIL TO RESPOND TO PLAINTIFF'S LETTER MOTION, PLAINTIFF IS GRANTED LEAVE TO RENEW ITS MOTION FOR SANCTIONS BY FRIDAY, DECEMBER 20, 2019 AND I INTEND TO RULE ON THE RENEWED MOTION BASED ON PLAINTIFF'S WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS ALONE." *Id.*

22. After a telephone conference on January 28, 2020, Magistrate Judge Cave granted Plaintiff's letter-motion to renew its motion for discovery sanctions and ordered the Entity Defendants to have attorneys file appearances on their behalf by February 28, 2020. (Jan. 28, 2020 Order 1, ECF No. 186.)

23. After Defendants requested an extension of time to find representation, Magistrate Judge Cave granted a two-month extension of the deadline by which the Entity Defendants had to be represented by counsel. (Mar. 3, 2020, ECF No. 188.)

24. Magistrate Judge Cave denied a second request for an extension from Defendants and directed the Parties to file a joint status report by July 1, 2020 and instructed Plaintiff to refile its request for a Certificate of Default against the Entity Defendants. (June 17, 2020 Order, ECF No. 194.)

25. The Clerk issued a Certificate of Default against the Entity Defendants on June 18, 2020. (ECF No. 197.)

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PLAINTIFF'S DAMAGES

Copyright Infringement of Plaintiff's Guide

26. Because Plaintiff obtained its '901 Registration long before Entity Defendants infringed upon Plaintiff's exclusive rights protected by that copyright registration, Plaintiff is entitled to statutory damages for willful infringement as well as its reasonable attorneys' fees and costs. "Where a defendant has defaulted, a complaint's allegations of willfulness may be taken as true." *Elsevier*, 2019 WL 74606, at *6.

27. When calculating appropriate statutory damages for copyright infringement, the Second Circuit holds that a court should consider the following factors: (1) an infringer's state of mind; (2) expenses saved, and profits earned, by the infringer; (3) revenue lost by the copyright owner; (4) any deterrent effect on the infringer and third parties; (5) whether the infringer cooperated in providing evidence concerning the value of the infringing material; and (6) the conduct and attitude of the parties. *Id.* at *7 (citations omitted).

28. The maximum statutory damages available for willful copyright infringement are \$150,000 per copyright infringed. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c).

29. Because Entity Defendants refused to participate in discovery, Plaintiff has no evidence upon which to analyze factor two. Because of the length of time during which the willful infringement has been ongoing, it is also near impossible to analyze the third factor without any knowledge of Entity Defendants' infringing sales. The remaining factors all weigh heavily in favor of an award at the high end of the statutory range for willful infringement. After a review of the case law in this District, however, Plaintiff acknowledges that \$100,000 per work is considered fair. *Id.* at *11.

30. Consequently, Plaintiff seeks an award of \$100,000 in statutory damages for Entity Defendants' willful infringement of Plaintiff's rights under its '901 Registration.

Copyright Infringement of Plaintiff's '000 and '540 Registrations

31. Plaintiff recognizes that, because the '000 and '540 Registrations were pending before the Copyright Office after the infringement began, Plaintiff may not recover statutory damages for infringement of either work. Because Entity Defendants did not share any meaningful information during discovery, Plaintiff used a novel approach to calculate the damages requested herein for these copyright registrations.

32. Both the '000 and '540 Registrations relate to the creation and maintenance of the Infringing Website. The first security breach about which Plaintiff is aware occurred on December 17, 2015, Compl. ¶ 47, just over four and a half years ago.

33. Plaintiff estimates that it spent \$45,000 per year creating and maintaining its website at <ffl123.com> during the first five years of its existence. Plaintiff therefore seeks recovery of \$202,500 for Entity Defendants' willful violation of the above-captioned two copyright registrations, which amount represents four and a half years of Plaintiff's annual website expenditures during the initial years of the website's existence. (Maddox Decl. ¶ 28.)

Damages Caused by the Entity Defendants' False Advertising

34. "Under the law of the Second Circuit, even where a plaintiff has not demonstrated injury, the equitable disgorgement of a defendant's profits may be ordered in the interests of deterrence if the plaintiff can show that defendant willfully violated the Lanham Act."

Dependable Sales & Serv., Inc. v. TrueCar, Inc., 377 F. Supp. 3d 337, 342 (S.D.N.Y.), *on reconsideration*, 394 F. Supp. 3d 368 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (citing *George Basch Co. v. Blue Coral, Inc.*, 968 F.2d 1532, 1537 (2d Cir. 1992)).

35. “Section 35 of the Lanham Act specifically provides that ‘if the court shall find that the amount of the recovery based on profits is inadequate[,] . . . the court may in its discretion enter judgment for such sum as the court shall find to be just.’” *Merck Eprova AG v. Gnosis S.p.A.*, 760 F.3d 247, 262-63 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a)). “While this enhancement provision, introduced in 1905, ‘was included to enable courts to redress fully plaintiffs whose actual damages were difficult to prove,’ we have since reasoned that enhanced damages may also be awarded under Section 35 where ‘deterrence of willful infringement is needed.’” *Id.* (citation omitted). In “exceptional cases,” as contemplated by 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a), where the false advertiser acted in bad faith, this District has awarded attorneys’ fees. *Mobius Mgmt. Sys., Inc. v. Fourth Dimension Software, Inc.*, 880 F. Supp. 1005, 1026 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).

36. Because Entity Defendants have prevented Plaintiff from obtaining a realistic view of their profits associated with their willful false advertising, which was literally false and dangerous to consumers, Plaintiff seeks an award of \$100,000 to help Plaintiff address the confusion created by Entity Defendants’ intentionally false advertising and deter them and others from such false advertising going forward. Plaintiff also seeks an award of its reasonable attorneys’ fees in connection with this claim as described below.

Damages Caused by the Entity Defendants’ Violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act

37. The CFAA penalizes unauthorized access to protected computers with intent to defraud or cause damage and allows “[a]ny person who suffers damage or loss” from conduct prohibited by the statute to bring an action for damages if the claim involves one of five factors. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g).

38. The relevant factor here is whether Entity Defendants’ conduct caused “loss to 1 or more persons during any 1-year period . . . aggregating at least \$5,000 in value.”

§ 1030(a)(5)(B). The CFAA defines “loss” as “any reasonable cost to any victim, including the cost of responding to an offense, conducting a damage assessment, and restoring the data, program, system, or information . . . and any revenue lost, cost incurred, or other consequential damages incurred because of interruption of service” § 1030(e)(11).

39. Plaintiff did not immediately notice that Entity Defendants had de-indexed its website so it can only provide an estimated amount of revenue lost due to the interruption of service.

40. Plaintiff therefore seeks \$20,000 in lost revenue under the CFAA, which is based on two weeks of revenue from the time Entity Defendants caused the service interruption. (Maddox Decl. ¶ 29.)

Damages Caused by Entity Defendants’ Theft of Trade Secrets

41. Because Entity Defendants misuse of Plaintiff’s trade secrets was willful and in bad faith, Plaintiff is entitled to recover punitive damages in addition to any related recovery under the Copyright Act. *See Softel, Inc. v. Dragon Medical and Scientific Communications Ltd.*, 891 F. Supp. 935 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (awarding \$250,000 in punitive damages on a trade secret claim where the court awarded only \$34,880.28 in compensatory damages).

42. “The amount fixed need bear no particular relationship to the amount awarded as compensatory damages.” *Id.* at 945. “However, punitive damages should bear a reasonable relationship to the wrong committed.” *Id.*

43. Considering the bad faith actions described in detail above, Plaintiff seeks \$50,000 in compensatory damages, which is the estimated value attributed to the prospective customers lost by virtue of the Entity Defendants’ trade secret theft. (Maddox Decl. ¶ 30.) Plaintiff also seeks \$50,000 in punitive damages because Entity Defendants’ conduct was willful and in bad faith.

Damages Caused by the Entity Defendants' Violation of New York Gen. Bus. Law § 349

44. In accordance with N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349(h), Plaintiff seeks \$1,000.

PLAINTIFF'S REASONABLE ATTORNEYS' FEES

45. In 2017, all attorneys working for Plaintiff on the above-captioned matter billed a total of 362.4 hours as shown in the attached **Exhibit A**.

46. In 2018, all attorneys working for Plaintiff on the above-captioned matter billed a total of 98.9 hours as shown in the attached **Exhibit B**.

47. In 2019, all attorneys working for Plaintiff on the above-captioned matter billed a total of 5.5 hours as shown in the attached **Exhibit C**.

48. In 2020, all attorneys working for Plaintiff on the above-captioned matter billed a total of 27.9 hours as shown in the attached **Exhibit D**.

49. I have been the lead attorney on this case since it was filed. The total time billed by all attorneys on this case equals 494.7 hours.

50. It is my normal practice to review all invoices before they are sent to clients for payment so that I may make adjustments (down, never up) to ensure that the invoices sent to clients are fair and reasonable. I followed this practice in connection with the billing entries made in connection with my work for Plaintiff to eliminate unnecessary, duplicative, or excessive time, and to otherwise ensure that, in my professional judgment, all charges were appropriate. I also wrote off costs such as postage and fees for legal research.

51. I was admitted to the bar in the State of New York in 2010.

52. The only other attorney who billed any time to this matter, as shown in Exhibits A through C, graduated law school in my class and was admitted to the bar in the State of Michigan in 2009.

53. I have reviewed awards of attorneys' fees in the Southern District of New York and familiarized myself with the billing rates for attorneys who work in the District with my skill and experience.

54. "The reasonable hourly rate is the rate a paying client would be willing to pay;" district courts must bear in mind that that "a reasonable, paying client wishes to spend the minimum necessary to litigate the case effectively." *Laboratorios Rivas, SRL v. Ugly & Beauty, Inc.*, No. 11 CIV. 5980 RA JLC, 2013 WL 5977440, at *13–14 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 12, 2013), *report and recommendation adopted*, No. 11 CIV. 5980 RA JLC, 2014 WL 112397 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 2014) (quotation omitted). "In assessing the reasonableness of the hourly rates, the Court may consider the prevailing market rates 'for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience and reputation.'" *Id.* (quoting *Gierlinger v. Gleason*, 160 F.3d 858, 882 (2d Cir.1998) (quoting *Blum v. Stenson*, 465 U.S. 886, 896 n. 11 (1984))); *see, e.g., Reiter v. MTA New York City Transit Auth.*, 457 F.3d 224, 232 (2d Cir.2006)).

55. In 2014, the Southern District of New York collected several cases awarding fees to attorneys handling a similar intellectual property dispute and wrote that "the Court finds the billing rates appropriate given that they are roughly equivalent to (or less than) fees charged by attorneys in this District at small to midsize firms in other trademark infringement and intellectual property cases." *Laboratorios*, 2013 WL 5977440, at *15 (citing *See, e.g., Dweck v. Diana Amadi & Malibu Denim Co.*, 10 Civ. 2577(RMB)(HBP), 2012 WL 3020029, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 6, 2012) (collecting cases approving \$180 to \$440 hourly rates for intellectual property associates and finding \$250 to be reasonable rate for attorneys whose titles were unclear and in spite of "sketchy" background information), *Report & Recommendation*, adopted by 2012 WL 3024185 (S.D.N.Y. Jul 24, 2012); *Grand Fia Inc. v. Hakakin*, 11 Civ. 2578(PGG)(KNF),

2012 WL 3578175, at *8–9 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2012) (approving rates of \$445 and \$465 per hour for partner experienced in trademark infringement and intellectual property law and \$200 per hour for junior associate), *Report & Recommendation, adopted by*, Order dated December 28, 2012 (11 Civ. 2578, Dkt. No. 25)).

56. Since the filing of this case, I have been a partner at two small firms, one of which I founded this year.

57. Since 2010, I have regularly litigated in federal and state courts throughout the country and before the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board.

58. I am admitted to practice in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and before the Eastern District of New York, District of Massachusetts, Northern District of Illinois, and Sixth Circuit. I regularly litigate intellectual property disputes in other federal districts through a *pro hac vice* admission such as the federal trademark and copyright infringement cases I have currently pending in the Southern District of Florida, Central District of California, and District of Arizona. I have focused on intellectual property since before attending law school, indeed, my interest in intellectual property law is the reason I decided to go to law school after trying to make a career as a journalist.

59. In light of the 2012 approval of \$440 per hour for “intellectual property associates” that the Southern District of New York found reasonable in 2012 in *Dweek*, cited in paragraph 55 above, an hourly rate of \$500 per hour should be applied to the attorney time in this case.

60. Applying \$500 per hour, which is less than the international firm where I previously litigated billed for my time, to the total number of attorney hours spent on this case yields a total of \$247,350 in attorneys’ fees.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746.

TOTAL DAMAGES AND FEES CLAIMED

61. The total damages and fees sought by Plaintiff equal seven hundred seventy thousand eight hundred fifty dollars (\$770,850) as described in detail above.

62. An award of prejudgment interest is “within the discretion of the trial court and is normally reserved for ‘exceptional’ cases.” *Merck Eprova AG v. Gnosis S.p.A.*, 760 F.3d 247, 265 (2d Cir. 2014) (affirming trial court’s award of prejudgment interest) (quoting *Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc. v. Two Wheel Corp.*, 918 F.2d 1060, 1064 (2d Cir. 1990)).

63. Because this case is an exceptional case within the meaning of the Lanham Act, Plaintiff seeks an award of prejudgment interest as well.

NO INQUEST INTO DAMAGES IS NEEDED

64. The Second Circuit recognizes that “Rule 55(b) does not require a hearing on damages in every case.” *Fustok v. ContiCommodity Servs., Inc.*, 873 F.2d 38, 40 (2d Cir. 1989). The rule “allows but does not require the district judge to conduct a hearing.” *Action S.A. v. Marc Rich & Co., Inc.*, 951 F.2d 504, 508 (2d Cir.1991), *cert. denied*, 503 U.S. 1006 (1992) (citing *Fustok*, 873 F.2d at 40). In *Fustok* “this Circuit held that it was not necessary for the district court to hold a hearing to fix damages after a default judgment had been entered where the court had ‘relied upon detailed affidavits and documentary evidence, supplemented by the District Judge’s personal knowledge of the record, gained during four years of involvement with the litigation’ in making its determination.” *Tamarin v. Adam Caterers, Inc.*, 13 F.3d 51, 53-54 (2d Cir. 1993)

(citing *Fustok*, 873 F.2d at 40); *accord Action S.A.*, 951 F.2d at 508 (no need to hold inquest on damages after default judgment had been entered where district judge was inundated with affidavits, evidence and oral presentations by opposing counsel).

65. Because of the detail included in this attorney declaration and Your Honor's knowledge of the Parties' years long dispute, Plaintiff believes that no such inquest is necessary. It is entirely within Your discretion to determine whether or not to conduct an inquest into damages.

**DEFAULT JUDGMENT AWARDING DAMAGES AGAINST ENTITY DEFENDANTS
IS APPROPRIATE PRIOR TO RESOLUTION OF THE ENTIRE ACTION**

66. "Rule 54(b) provides an exception to the general principle that a final judgment is proper only after the rights and liabilities of all the parties to the action have been adjudicated. It empowers the district court to enter a final judgment as to fewer than all of the parties in an action, but 'only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay.'" *Hogan v. Consol. Rail Corp.*, 961 F.2d 1021, 1024–25 (2d Cir. 1992) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b)). "The determination of whether to grant Rule 54(b) certification is committed to the discretion of the district court and will be set aside only for an abuse of discretion." *Id.*

67. The Southern District of New York recognizes that Supreme Court precedent from 1872 limiting the circumstances under which default judgment may be entered against fewer than all defendants have "treated this holding narrowly, agreeing that it prohibits entry of a default judgment 'against one of several defendants (1) where the theory of recovery is one of true joint liability, such that, as a matter of law, no one defendant may be liable unless all defendants are liable, or (2) where the nature of the relief demanded is such that, in order to be effective, it must be granted against each and every defendant.'" *Friedman v. Lawrence*, No. 90

CIV. 5584 (VLB), 1991 WL 206308, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 2, 1991) (citing 6 James Wm. Moore, et al., Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 55.06 at 55–39 (2d ed. 1991) (citing, *inter alia*, *In re Uranium Antitrust Litig.*, 617 F.2d 1248, 1256–58 (7th Cir.1980); *Overfield v. Pennroad Corp.*, 42 F.Supp. 586, 616–17 (E.D.Pa.1941), *supplemented*, 48 F.Supp. 1008 (E.D.Pa.1943), *aff'd*, 146 F.2d 889 (3d Cir.1944)); *accord, e.g., Farzetta v. Turner & Newall, Ltd.*, 797 F.2d 151, 154 (3d Cir.1986); *Gulf Coast Fans, Inc. v. Midwest Elec. Importers, Inc.*, 740 F.2d 1499, 1512 (11th Cir.1984); *Exquisite Form Indus., Inc. v. Exquisite Fabrics of London*, 378 F.Supp. 403, 416 (S.D.N.Y.1974); 10 Charles A. Wright, et al., *Federal Practice & Procedure: Civil 2d* § 2690 (1983)).

68. Because the liability of Defendant Oskouie does not necessarily depend on the liability of Entity Defendants, a default judgment against Entity Defendants is not premature in this case.

69. It would be inequitable to allow Entity Defendants to continue damaging Plaintiff while Defendant Oskouie continued to litigate.

MISCELLANEOUS STATEMENTS

70. During third party discovery, PayPal provided us with the IP addresses used to access Defendants' PayPal accounts. Several of the IP addresses used to access Defendants' accounts were also used to access several of Plaintiff's online accounts at least once and some accounts were accessed dozens of times from those IP addresses.

71. I prepared Plaintiff's Reply to Defendants' Memorandum Opposing Plaintiff's Application for a Preliminary Injunction and the document referred to as Exhibit A therein. (ECF NO. 28-1.) Exhibit A, ECF No. 28-1, is a true and accurate printout of Defendants' website as it appeared on June 28, 2017.

72. I prepared Plaintiff's Reply to Defendants' Memorandum Opposing Plaintiff's Application for a Preliminary Injunction and the document referred to as Exhibit B therein. (ECF NO. 28-2.) Exhibit B, ECF No. 28-2, is a true and accurate printout of an online forum where relevant consumers had discussed Defendants' use of the fictional character Henry Jackson as their fake president.

73. I prepared Plaintiff's Reply to Defendants' Memorandum Opposing Plaintiff's Application for a Preliminary Injunction and the document referred to as Exhibit E therein. (ECF NO. 28-5.) Exhibit E, ECF No. 28-5, is a true and accurate printout of the terms and conditions on Defendants' website at *ffltrust.com* as they appeared on June 28, 2017.

74. Attached hereto as **Exhibit E** are true and accurate printouts showing Plaintiff's two relevant copyright registrations that registered during the pendency of this lawsuit.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746.

Dated: July 17, 2020

Respectfully submitted,

By:



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